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Other Others: further remarks 
on transferential materialism 
   
 Gabriel Tupinambá 
 
1. A question concerning transference 
 
I would like to begin with a concrete example which might help to 
introduce us to a rather unexplored domain of psychoanalytic theory and 
to Robert Pfaller's important contribution to its development.  
 
 The Testimony Clinic – "Clínica do Testemunho" – is a clinical 
apparatus created in Brazil, under guidance of the Amnesty Commission, 
with the aim of providing psychic aid to victims of State violence1. 
Originally developed as a recourse to deal with the subjective effects of 
the civil-military dictatorship which lasted for 21 years, it was later 
expanded to also address the problem of State violence as it perpetuates 
itself within the democratic regime, especially through the State's 
interventions – and lack thereof –  in the slums and peripheries of the 
country2.  
 
 Three interconnected aspects of this project are worth mentioning 
here. First of all, the Testimony Clinic, as its name already attests to, 
seeks to explore the possible clinical responses to situations of socio-
historic catastrophe. The qualifier is warranted, because the very notion 
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of "testimony" has been introduced into theoretical consideration in the 
last fifty years as a way to describe the predicament of those who 
underwent a particular sort of traumatic experience: traumas which 
pierce through not only the fabric of the individual's symbolic universe, 
but of the social space out of which that particular symbolic texture is 
woven. In other words, what is at stake in these situations is not only the 
difficulty of finding and constructing the signifiers which might 
symbolically allow for the subject to speak of what has taken place, but 
also the difficulty of having these signifiers recognized as "significant"3 to 
begin with.  
 
 The question of the witnessing of war atrocities and police brutality 
is not only the question of the elaboration of the trauma by the subject, 
but above all the question of the paradoxical condition through which the 
very possibility of speaking about what has taken place contradicts and 
empties out the legitimacy of what is being stated - one has witnessed 
something which is deemed impossible to exist, therefore if there is a 
witness, nothing has been witnessed4. This paradox, however, is not the 
same as the intrinsic contradiction between the position of enunciation 
and of the enunciated, central to psychoanalytic theory: it is not a matter 
of recognizing that "the fact of saying disappears under what is heard in 
what is said", to paraphrase Lacan, but rather that the fact of saying is all 
that is heard from what is said. One might work through a traumatic 
experience, find a way to transmit it to others – and yet, nothing gets 
passed on, as the very process of transmission which makes it 
commensurable with other signifiers also makes it incommensurable 
with what is being signified. One can only testify to it, to make oneself a 
witness, but not signify, making oneself a subject, of what took place. 
 
 Even though most discussions around this clinical apparatus 
seem to revolve around the category of the subject – with Lacanian 
psychoanalysts questioning with suspicion the elaboration of a setting 
which defines beforehand a determinate region of experience as the site 
for clinical intervention - the essential impasse of the Testimony Clinic 
seems to lie elsewhere, in the figure of the Other. As I briefly mentioned, 
the paradox of the testimony is somewhat distinct from the contradictory 




nature of signification: it concerns a suffering that is not caused by one's 
indelible estrangement from what is said – I say or do something, but it 
means something other than what I thought it did – it is not a matter of 
the dialectics in which speech, once deposited or inscribed in the Other, 
becomes other to me, but rather a suffering connected to the 
impossibility of inscribing speech into this shared symbolic space 
without this very act preventing - rather than promoting - the implication 
of the subject's position in the autonomy of what is said. A witness is 
someone who cannot become other to themselves through speech, they 
are rather other to their speech. This is why the debate about the subject, 
albeit relevant, misses the crucial point: without a previous inscription in 
the Other of the possibility of certain impossible experiences, there might 
be no symbolic space for such a trauma to possibly inscribe itself, not 
even as the signifier of an impossible signification. What is at stake in the 
public affirmation that the Testimony Clinic deals with State violence is 
therefore not a countertransferential strategy which imbues speech with 
meanings extracted from the analyst's own desire, but rather the process 
of shaping the Other to render it commensurate or homogeneous to the 
particular quality of social traumas. 
 
 But this raises an interesting and quite unexplored question: what 
is then the effect of funding this project through the State? That is, what 
are the effects for the transferential setting of analysts presenting 
themselves before patients as representatives of the State? This enquiry 
is relevant not only in the case of the Testimony Clinic, but also of other 
sites of psychoanalytic intervention in Brazil, as most of the popular 
access to analysis or analytic-inspired treatments in the country is 
subsidized by the government. But in this particular case, the question is 
quite central to the very idea of the project, as the presence of the State 
as a backdrop to the clinical setting participates in the institutional 
recognition of the existence of this form of suffering. Still, if it contributes 
to inform5 the otherness of the clinical setting – connecting the "small 
other" of the analyst to a "big Other" who knows that the dictatorship did 
include the (not so) secret horrors of torture, kidnaps and missing 
persons - it also adds a new sort of dynamic to that space: for example, 
could one trust an analyst who has been paid by the State to listen to the 




crimes of that same State? It is not a matter of settling this question, but 
of realizing that it makes the subject's relation to an otherwise abstract 
and intangible agency concrete and interpretable. 
 
 But what does this mean for the concept of the Other? How can 
there be different symbolic spaces in which speech and experience are 
made significant in different ways? This is a question which neither 
Freud nor Lacan directly addressed, and we will return to it later on. For 
now, it is worth noting that once we realize that the border between the 
insignificant and the significant can be shifted not only by a change in 
the subject's position, but also by the institutional context of the clinical 
space, we can then return to the classical, private clinical setting and 
inquire about its own institutional contribution to the settling of this 
border. What might be relegated to insignificance not due to vacillations 
in the desire of the analyst, but by the logistical and institutional 
commitments required for a private clinic to exist? After all, many people 
who seek the Testimony Clinic had their own private analysts before and 
during this parallel treatment, but some of them only go through the 
process of working through the experience of the dictatorship when their 
speech within the clinical setting organized by the latter6.  
 
 Similar experiences – albeit with significant differences worth 
exploring in their own right – can be found in various clinical projects in 
which the listening of suffering is informed by a previous commitment to 
the existence of some dimension of social and private life which defines 
a common symbolic inscription. To mention a few, all of them happening 
in Brazil: the Refugees of Belo Monte project, which sought to provide 
psychic aid to the families which lost their homes in the Mariana disaster 
– here, in fact, the population did not recognize the legitimacy of the 
project while they did not sever their ties with State funding – the Oficina 
Acadêmica, which focuses on the effects on the youth of having been 
granted increasing formal access to the university without the material 
basis to allow for the same academic experience as other students - a 
project which struggles to remain a para-academic address, as it 
focuses on the experience of those who do not fully "belong" in 
academia - and the Circle of Studies of Idea and Ideology, which offers a 




place for militants who are mourning the end of the previous sequence 
of Leftist politics in Brazil – and which constantly struggles with defining 
its place, neither outside nor itself political practice. In all of these cases, 
there is not so much a singling out of who should access or make use of 
these spaces, but rather the effort of constituting an Other 
commensurate with the impossible experiences of social catastrophes, 
failed social expectations and political utopias. 
 
 We will return later on to the political import of this investigation, 
but what this preamble already helps us to pinpoint is a certain relation 
between the structure of the otherness at stake in different traumas and 
fantasies and the structure of otherness which, shaping the clinic, can - 
as per Lacan's famous definition of transference - make actual the reality 
of the unconscious7.  
 
2. The theory of formal otherness 
 
I have previously tried to address this formal articulation between 
impossible objects and the transferential setting in a text called 
Transferential Materialism (Hamza & Ruda, 2015), which explored the 
ontological commitments of Freud's theory of transference, showing that 
the materialism at stake not in the Freudian theory, but the analytic 
technique, answers through artificial means to the principle that 
"something that is formally other-to-thought can only be thought by 
another of a certain form" (2015: 145). This was a first attempt to 
theoretically highlight a principle of "ontological homogeneity" which 
conditions which sort of social relation might serve as a effective model 
for some phantasmatic scene: traumas which concern the subject as an 
object of desire for her father, as in the case of Dora, have the "shape" of 
a dual setting in which the personhood of the analyst is enough for it to 
be transitive with the otherness of this impossible love encounter - even 
though Dora cannot think the object she is for the Other without ceasing 
to be that object, through the otherness of the analyst this thought can be 
"dramatized" and indirectly enjoyed in situ. One cannot intervene upon 
someone's libidinal attachments in effigie. 





 Lacan famously developed the concept of the "subject supposed 
to know" to account for the inner-structure of transference in the analytic 
clinic, the process through which there comes to be a "knowledge that 
only delivers itself to the mistaking of the subject' (Lacan, 2001: 335). The 
concept of the subject supposed to know helps us to grasp the dynamics 
of transference and the role of the analyst in the production of knowledge 
without the need to assume that the analyst knows anything about what 
is "truly" going on with the analysand – that is, it highlights the purely 
formal role of his position in the circuit of speech in analysis.  
 
 Even though this was not Lacan's own approach to the matter, the 
clearest way to locate the function of the subject supposed to know in 
analysis is to consider it as a consequence of the paradoxical status of 
psychoanalysis' "golden rule", the rule of free association. What does it 
mean to speak under the rule that one should say "whatever comes to 
mind"? On the one hand, this rule seeks to suspend any extrinsic 
normative commitments: there is no one topic, situation or crazy thought 
which is by default excluded from pertinence. On the other, the rule to 
follow no extrinsic rules in the choice of what to say creates an 
impossible situation: whatever regularities appear in speech now can no 
longer be explained away by an explicit pact to keep to that topic, or to 
preserve some level of politeness or morality – one is implicated in the 
rules that end up being followed in analysis: even the strategy of doing 
"exactly" what the free association rule asks us to do, to speak about 
anything, attaches itself to the speaker as something which implicates 
her in what it said. In other words, the rule of free association suspends 
extrinsic constraints in order to make intrinsic constraints legible, that is, it 
makes speech interpretable. If the patient speaks in an almost aleatory 
form, or speaks about past traumas, or avoids saying certain things or 
repeats a certain expression in vastly different contexts – all of this 
becomes significant, that is, it all points to the subject of enunciation that 
disappears under the implicit normativity guiding what is being said.  
 
 The concept of the subject supposed to know makes intelligible 
the role of the analyst in all of this - this is the concept which accounts for 




how the inherent otherness of these constraints in speech can appear to 
the speaker by taking the form of a constraint that is other to the speaker. 
To use a simplified example, when faced with the impossible rule to 
freely associate, one might suppose that, underneath that vague 
injunction, the analyst really wants to hear about our sexual history, and 
therefore start describing our sexual encounters or preferences. The 
supposition of what the analyst knows - that some hidden meaning is 
locked in the sphere of sexuality – becomes the means through which 
the normativity we are following for no extrinsic reason can make itself 
legible. The very mistaking of the subject – which many times appears as 
an attempt to avoid "duping" the analyst, to speak what is "truly" 
important – is what effectively produces the knowledge which can then 
be returned to the subject in an inverted form: the only sovereign of this 
rule is the subject herself, no one asked of her to speak of sex – and, 
more importantly, to speak of it in the way she did. The subject supposed 
to know, as the instance mobilized by the speaker as a mediator 
between speech and the intrinsic rules of speech, participates in the 
dialectics that produces some information about the speaker – not about 
the external referents of what has been said, but about the constraints 
which shaped this signification process: knowledge not about what 
speech refers to as having taken place, but about what is taking place 
while we speak in the clinic. In this way, Lacan can simultaneously 
demonstrate the necessity of the analyst in the clinical setting – a 
position without which this mistaking would never take place – without 
this implying that the analyst should try to read into what is being said by 
the analysand: the mistaking is the source of the knowledge about the 
subject of that speech, a knowledge that is constituted by speaking, 
rather than communicated through it. 
 
 The concept of the subject supposed to know therefore highlights 
the empty but necessary role of the analyst in mediating the passage 
from an otherness within speech to an Other to the speaker. It does so by 
highlighting the way the analyst helps to shape the space of free 
association, adding a sort of "ideal point" into this space, a point of 
obscurity regarding what is being heard, which turns any trajectory of 
signification into an attempt to signify the desire of one's interlocutor. This 




is why analytic interpretation is a second-order intervention: the effort of 
making sense of an impossibility actually falls upon the analysand - 
everything said in analysis acquires this hermeneutic quality due to the 
free association rule - and the analyst rather intervenes to display the 
intrinsic constraints of this signification process, to question the 
"meaning of meaning" in the analysand's speech. 
 
 What is usually not mentioned here, though, is that Lacan's formal 
treatment of the subject supposed to know allows us to see how 
transference comes to acquire the same form as that of love. In Freud's 
The Dynamic of Transference (1912), the reason why transference in 
analysis has the structure of an idealized love relationship - where one 
seeks to find out what sort of object of desire one is for the Other - is 
explained genetically: transference takes this form of suppositions and 
love attachments to the analyst because our libidinal history is only 
composed of such relationships and therefore this is what emerges back 
when we suspend other constraints. But with Lacan's formal treatment of 
the structure of transference no metapsychological commitment to the 
general form of fantasy is needed: if transference is conditioned by the 
formal structure of the setting, then we can accept the thesis that 
analysis is capable of intervening upon the phantasmatic suppositions 
which emerge under these conditions without supposing that every 
fantasy can acquire actuality through this clinical setting. A dual setting, 
in which the private person of the analyst "absorbs" the obscure effects 
of the rule of free association by making oneself its guarantor, is 
commensurate with a circuit that expresses "love type relations", 
because otherness in love splits the loved one in this same way - 
between their private being and their intimate, unfathomable kernel. To 
render the otherness of love thinkable, we require an other that could be 
loved. 
 
 Slavoj Žižek's theory of the "subject supposed to believe" was a 
crucial contribution to the development of this implicit consequence of 
Lacan's theory of transference. The concept was introduced by Žižek in 
the context of understanding the underlying transferential operation at 
stake in commodity fetishism:  





Beneath the apparently humanist-ideological opposition of 
"human beings" and "things", there lurks another, much more 
productive notion, which is that of the mystery of substitution 
and/or displacement: how is it ontologically possible that the 
innermost "relations between people" can be displaced onto (or 
replaced by) "relations between things"? In other words, is it not a 
basic feature of the Marxian notion of commodity fetishism that 
"things believe instead of us, in place of us"? The point worth 
repeating again and again is that, in Marx's notion of fetishism, the 
fetishist inversion lies not in what people think they are doing, but 
in their social activity itself 8 
 
 The crucial strategy here is that Žižek recognizes that commodity 
fetishism brings into play the same "mystery of substitution" that 
psychoanalytic transference does, but without assuming an ontology 
which only allows - like in the case of the analytic setting - for "relations 
between people" to be displaced onto new relations between people. 
The enigma of how relations between people can be displaced onto 
relations between things therefore invites analytic consideration, but 
rejects the ontological limitations imposed by the form of transference 
theorized by Freud and Lacan. On the one hand, Žižek maintains that this 
displacement, like in the case of transference, is not the posterior 
displacement onto others of something we previously knew or directly 
assumed - like in transference, the mistaking participates in the 
constitution of the phenomena under consideration, as "there is no 
immediate, self-present living subjectivity to whom the belief embodied 
in "social things" can be attributed and who is then dispossessed of it". 
 
 However, if commodity fetishism does make use of a supposition 
onto others that is not merely derivative, but constitutive, Žižek 
nonetheless affirms that this process is essentially distinct from that of 
clinical transference:  
 
The two notions, that of the subject supposed to believe and that 
of the subject supposed to know, are not symmetrical because 




belief and knowledge themselves are not symmetrical. At its most 
radical, the status of the (Lacanian) big Other qua symbolic 
institution is that of belief (trust), not that of knowledge, since belief 
is symbolic and knowledge is real (the big Other involves, and 
relies on a fundamental "trust").3 Belief is always minimally 
"reflective", a "belief in the belief of the other" ("I still believe in 
Communism" is the equivalent of saying "I believe there are still 
people who believe in Communism"), while knowledge is precisely 
not knowledge about the fact that there is another who knows. For 
this reason, I can BELIEVE through the other, but I cannot KNOW 
through the other. That is to say, owing to the inherent reflectivity of 
belief, when another believes in my place, I myself believe through 
him, but knowledge is not reflective in the same way: when the 
other is supposed to know, I do not know through him.9 
 
 Žižek makes two crucial distinctions here. The first concerns the 
difference in terms of reflexivity: when we suppose someone else holds a 
belief, this displacement still carries some transitive value - something of 
the displaced belief remains operative for us, even though we only 
"believe the other believes", as supposing and believing are ultimately 
the same activity - while the same is not true for knowledge, as 
supposing the other knows does not entail that we have any access to 
that knowledge: it does not constitute a knowledge about the other's 
knowledge. This difference is of capital importance if we keep in mind 
the discussion concerning the commensurability between, for example, 
love attachments and the form of otherness in analytic transference. We 
suggested that the fantasies which are actualized in the clinical space 
have the form of an interrogation of the Other's desire not because this is 
the structure of all fantasies, but because this is the "shape" of the Other 
in the private clinical space - that is, the intransitive structure of 
knowledge, where supposing a knowledge is not knowing it ourselves, 
participates in the process of turning the otherness of desire, this 
unknowable, into the supposition of another's knowledge and then, 
through interpretation, into a knowledge about the lack of knowledge. 
The structure of belief, on the other hand, informs a different space of 
displacements: the fact that a belief supposed in the other does not need 




to be ever directly assumed in order to become what it is allows the 
substitution process to involve passive others - for example, by 
displacing beliefs onto objects - as well as to involve positions which are 
incommensurate not only with our individual identifications, as in the 
case of the libidinal unconscious, but incommensurate with individuality 
as such.  
 
 Such is, in fact, the precise status of the belief displaced onto 
commodity fetishism: the social contract between commodities, through 
which all commodities abdicate the right to function as the "relative 
form" of value in the name of one single representative, the money-form, 
is objectively more vast in scope than any social contract binding a given 
community, as money circulates across the boundaries of different 
symbolic spaces, languages and value-systems10. No individual can 
vouch for this sovereign pact, not because we pretend like we do not, but 
because this belief in the sovereign status of the money-form is 
indifferent to the scale of individual decisions. It is a belief that would not 
be the belief that it is were it to be directly assumed - the exchange of 
money for commodities is not guaranteed by the fact that the actors 
involved in the exchange believe in money as a general equivalent, but 
on our belief that others, no matter in which shared system of value, take 
it to function as such. To displace the relation between (millions of) 
people to the relation between (two) things is thus formally 
commensurate with the otherness of the belief: there is an underlying 
homogeneity which makes use of the transitive status of the structure of 
belief so that, in believing others believe in the social contract binding the 
"equivalent" and "relative" sides of the form of value, I am closer to the 
actual belief I have than if I were to directly assume it. 
 
 This leads us to the second important distinction between the 
subject supposed to know and the subject supposed to believe, the fact 
that Žižek takes the phantasmatic structure of displaced beliefs to be the 
general case, while the supposition of knowledge is the special one. For 
Žižek, the operator of a subject supposed to know is "not the standard, 
but the exception, and that it gains its value in contrast to the subject 
supposed to believe as the standard feature of the symbolic order". In 




fact, when we accept the previous hypothesis that clinical transference 
renders actual only the fantasies commensurate with the private relation 
between analysand and analyst, it is not hard to see that this form is 
essentially commensurate with personal and familial relations, which, in 
our contemporary social world form a subclass of the social relations we 
are actually engaged in. The reason why other unconscious relations are 
not expressed in the analytic clinic - except "in effigie", that is, as 
signifieds - its because the clinic is structured in such a way as to only 
render actual those relations in which otherness is "informed" by the 
impersonal dimension of personality itself.  
 
3. Pfaller, a transferential materialist 
 
Robert Pfaller is not only an important contributor in the development of 
Žižek's theory of the subject supposed to believe, but has himself taken 
this theory much further by systematizing the class of phenomena he 
calls the "illusions without owners" and the general structure of 
"interpassivity" which underlies our relation to them. In this section, I 
would like to reconstruct some of the central claims of his brilliant book 
On the Pleasure Principle in Culture: Illusions without Owners (2014), 
which both consolidates and extends the reach of some of the insights 
discussed thus far. 
 
 Pfaller defines the object of his enquiry by its particular properties: 
"we are dealing with illusions that (1) seem to have no bearer; (2) are not 
dismissed by knowing better, but instead seem to be strengthened by it; 
(3) exert themselves in the form of a compulsion, albeit foreign and kept 
at a distance through knowledge; (4) often remain unnoticed; and (5) 
appear to be without content" (2014: 5). He is quick to highlight that these 
properties "are based on a difference in the forms of illusion rather than a 
difference in their content: it is a distinction based on the relationship 
between subject and illusion, on the different ways in which people refer 
to these illusions" (1). As Pfaller remarks, while there are illusions which 
participate in the economy of the subject's identity and enjoyment - 
illusions which are proudly and directly assumed as if they were true, like 
a belief in God or in self-regulating markets, etc - there are also illusions 




which only appear at a distance from the subject, which have practical 
but no subjective inscription in our lives. We would never say "I know it's 
silly, but I believe in free markets" -  such a belief requires, in our society, 
to be assumed in first person, under the guise of some ethical or moral 
stance - but this is precisely the way we express our relationship with 
other equally illusory instances: we "know better", we "know it's stupid" 
but still we believe in the horoscope, scream at malfunctioning 
machines, feel a sense of accomplished duty just by downloading digital 
copies of books, etc. We also "know better" than to think a piece of paper 
is in itself a form of wealth, but it is still money that we put under our 
mattresses when we fear for our savings in a time of crisis. What is 
remarkable in these cases is that this distance introduced by knowledge 
does not lead us, for example, to stop talking to a car that doesn't start, 
but rather guarantees the efficacy of this underlying belief - it prevents us 
from ever finding a situation which could unsettle this belief, as it was 
unsettled and de-legitimized from the very beginning. 
 
 Pfaller, like Žižek, is well-aware that this theory of the form of 
illusions keeps a paradoxical relation with psychoanalysis: referencing 
Lacan's "mirror stage theory", Pfaller remarks that the existence of these 
intransitive illusions, illusions which cannot be directly assumed, "is even 
more surprising in that illusions, as psychoanalytical theory has 
recognized, work to form the subject". After all, for both Freud and Lacan, 
it is out of certain fantasies that a subject carves its own consistency, as 
certain illusions come to structure and mediate the subject's inclusion in 
the world. But this is precisely what seems to be missing from the 
illusions that interest Pfaller here: "Although it may indeed be true that 
without illusions there are no subjects, it nonetheless seems that there 
are, at least, illusions without subjects." (2014: 33). These are illusions 
which - to return to Žižek's analysis of commodity fetishism - do not 
support a subject's self-transparent permanence in face of the 
contingency of her real conditions of existence, but rather structure those 
real conditions themselves. There is a profound formal difference 
between the belief that possessing this or that commodity changes or 
improves who I am - an illusion with a subject - and the belief at stake in 
the act of exchanging that commodity for some money, that is for the 




future possibility of the seller exchanging that money for something else. 
This second belief is operative regardless - and in fact because of - our 
"better knowledge" that money is "just paper", just a promissory note. As 
we said, it is rather a belief about the belief of others - it "goes on", 
functioning without us, while subjectively we can construct for ourselves 
an identificatory circuit that only includes our desire and the commodity 
we just purchased. 
 
 In The Structure of World History (2014), Kojin Karatani 
distinguishes the social pact at stake in the logic of state sovereignty, by 
which citizens collectively abdicate of their autonomy and invest it onto 
one person, which then gives expression, through his personhood, to the 
state as a whole, from the logic of the "social pact between 
commodities". For Karatani, the passage between simple, total and 
money-form in the first volume of Marx's Capital is isomorphic to the 
logic of sovereignty, in that all commodities come to abdicate their role 
as formal equivalents of the value of other commodities so that this 
function falls upon one sole commodity, the general equivalent. 
However, the difference between these two processes is clear enough: 
while the social contract concerns the proprietors of commodities - who 
in the interest of their security and wealth abide to a common law - the 
"social contract between commodities" is not performed by us: it is a 
pact between things themselves, so much so that a world-economy 
requires world-money to circulate between different states and lawful 
spaces, and therefore cross frontiers beyond which we simply would not 
recognize any communion with others. While we could call "interactivity" 
the positive reinforcement cycle between, in Rousseau's terms, the 
particular and the general will, between the citizen as subject and as 
sovereign, as rule-follower and rule-creator - in short, the logic of political 
participation - Robert Pfaller calls "interpassivity" (Pfaller, 2017) the 
negative or inverse cycle through which our subjective disengagement 
with a certain social process is precisely what constitutes its efficacy: the 
less everyone believes in a capitalist free economy the more it is an 
efficacious form of social synthesis between different subjectivized belief 
systems.  
 




 Still developing this interlocution between Pfaller, Žižek and Marx, 
we can also see how the theory of the subject supposed to believe, with 
its corresponding interpassive subject, is equally connected to a theory 
of "delegated enjoyment" (2014: 18). If Žižek had already suggested that 
the class of fantasies which are structured by the other's beliefs is more 
general than of those structured by the other's knowledge, Pfaller 
proposes that "the delegation of conviction and feelings creates special 
cases of the general principle of delegated enjoyment" (ibid: 19). The 
delegation of consumption is, for him, logically prior to the delegation of 
a certain belief onto the other.  
 
 And, in fact, this finds an interesting counterpart in Marx's own 
theory of value. In the very first section of Capital, Marx reminds us that 
even though a commodity must have use value, "a thing can be useful 
and the product of human labor without being a commodity" - that is, to 
become a commodity it is not enough to be a product of labor or to have 
use-value for oneself: the product must have "use value for others". To 
which he quickly adds: "not only for others (...) to become a commodity, a 
product must be transferred to another, whom it will serve as use value 
by means of an exchange" (1992:124). And as Marx makes increasingly 
clear - especially in the chapter dealing with the "metamorphoses" of the 
commodity in the exchange process (ibid: 198) - the reference to use-
value inherent to the commodity structure can be infinitely postponed: in 
fact, this is what allows it to become capital, the very fact that I can buy 
or produce it in order to sell it, that is, in order for another to consume it. 
The paradox is, thus, that even though nothing can be produced as a 
commodity if it is not produced for another's consumption, when we do 
become the consumers of a certain product we are only accidentally 
occupying the place of this other - structurally it could be further 
postponed, for example, if we decide to buy this product in order to re-
sell it for a higher price somewhere else. In this sense, the formal 
reference to another's enjoyment precedes and underlies the social pact 
between commodities, and, therefore, the delegated belief that mediates 
their interactions.  
 




 Two features allow Pfaller to develop this line of investigation 
further than Žižek had taken it. First of all, rather than focus on the 
functioning of ideological fantasies in our contemporary political 
predicament, he departs from an analysis of different phenomena of 
delegated consumption in art works. This leads him to explore cases - at 
stake for example in the case of "service art" - of "consumers who want 
to be replaced by something that consumes in their place" (Pfaler, 2014: 
20; 2017: 10). But, at the same time, Pfaller is also able to redirect Žižek's 
research by not focusing only on the strategies through which one seeks 
to consume the impossible - that is, what psychoanalysis calls 
"enjoyment" - but extending his investigation to deal with the delegation 
of pleasures which could be directly had as well. For him "interpassivity is 
not just a method of 'extended', indirect consumption that increases 
one's (necessarily limited) direct consumerist capacities" - instead, Pfaller 
claims that "interpassive subjects are actually feeling from their 
enjoyment. They even avoid it in those situations where personally 
experiencing it would be easy. Owners of recording devices, for example, 
watch less television once they have the recorder than they did when 
they owned only the television set. And travellers, who are certainly 
capable of viewing scenic attractions themselves, hold a camera to their 
eyes as if by reflex" (2014: 20). 
 
 This more general approach to the problem places new questions 
before us: why create an indirect structure for consumption when we 
could directly enjoy something? Or: how could these substitute actions - 
such as praying through praying wheels, recording television shows, etc 
- be placed in equivalence with the direct experience of consumption? 
Even further: how can all of this even take place without this very strategy 
being itself assumed by these interpassive subjects? After all, no one 
who records television shows, never to watch them, or makes hundreds 
of photocopies, never to read them, would claim "the recorder is 
watching in my place". This is how delegated enjoyment meets the 
Žižekian theory of displaced beliefs: only are certain substitutive actions 
displacing the consumption of religious comfort, tv series and literature 
onto things and other people, but they also displace the belief in this very 
strategy. Pfaller concludes: 





There are always two levels of delegation - namely the delegation 
of enjoyment and the delegation of belief (in the enacted 
performance of enjoyment). Interpassivity is always carried out 
simultaneously on both of these levels: on the one hand, 
consumption is delegated to a consumption medium - for 
example, reading to a photocopier; on the other hand, the belief in 
the equivalence between consumer and their vicarious 
consumption media must also be delegated. The interpassive 
subject does not personally believe that he or she has read via the 
copy machine; this belief is transferred to the scene's virtual 
audience. Delegated enjoyment this always entails feigning 
enjoyment for an observing agency with the help of a 
consumption medium, and simultaneously surrendering belief in 
this feigned fiction to the observing agency. (2014: 30). 
  
 But what is the status of this "observing agency"? One of the great 
contributions of Pfaller's theory of interpassivity is the idea of the "naive 
observer" (2014: 233) - the "virtual audience" which believes, in our place, 
in the equivalence between photocopying and reading, or between 
spinning a praying wheel and praying. We surely "know better" than to 
equate these two sets of actions, but it is actually our ignorance that we 
displace onto this observing agency - while we remain perfectly aware 
that these substitutive acts are silly and inconsequential, for some other 
instance the substituted and the enacted behaviours are the same. The 
theory of the naive observer allows us to conceptualize beliefs that 
remain fully operative even in a society where everyone "knows better" 
than to believe in them.  
 
 Pfaller's attention to the full spectrum of interpassive phenomena, 
beyond those instances where this strategy allows us to vicariously enjoy 
impossible objects, leads him to question the status of pleasure in 
general: "might all forms of pleasure that culture is able to produce be 
associated with objective illusions?" (2014: 33). That is, if delegation of 
consumption is at play even in situations in which we could otherwise 
directly reach its object, so that, economically, the pleasure arrived at by 




means of delegation is greater than the direct experience of the 
pleasurable object, could we then define pleasure as such in terms of 
such anti-participatory structure? Rather than focusing on the dramatic 
forms of indirect enjoyment at stake in the "beyond the pleasure 
principle" – those impossible experiences which we repeat in order to 
(fail to) master, making them commensurable with us in their very virtual 
insistence – Pfaller explores the inverse path, infusing pleasure itself with 
an indirect character. Beyond the interesting theoretical consequences of 
such an investigation, his enterprise has the additional benefit of 
dismantling a certain ideology which attaches subjective authenticity to a 
transgression of limits or to sacrifice – an ideology Lacan did not escape, 
for example in his apology of heroism in his seventh seminar - proposing 
instead a new vision in which the capacity to experience pleasure in 
culture is linked to culture's capacity to sustain certain autonomous 
social structures. 
 
 Another ideological trope that is challenged by Pfaller's theory - 
equally found in psychoanalysis – is the explicit precedence of totemism 
over animism as "grammars" for the subject's relation to the law and 
desire. In Freud (Freud, 1913) this is particularly clear, as he makes 
certain correspondences between the passage from animism to 
totemism, the passage from magic to religion and the sexual 
development of children into neurotic adulthood. Equating animisms' 
extension of the "I-thou" relation to inanimate things, the corresponding 
belief in magic as a technique for affecting things via representations, 
and the childish overvaluation of one own's ego, Freud concludes that 
"magical thinking" is a primitive mode of libidinal economy, one in which 
we cannot yet separate our thoughts about things from things 
themselves - to wish is to at least partially obtain what is wished for. This 
animistic circuit between ego and object-libido would be increasingly 
curbed by "reality testing" – as we constitute ourselves as lacking 
subjects – and this would lead to the totemic grammar of neurosis: the 
displacement onto an exceptional figure, the father, who is supposed to 
enjoy what we do not have. The introduction of lack into this economy, 
separating ego and object, transposing satisfaction onto an exceptional 
other, would also correspond to the passage from a magical to a 




religious economy - hence the institution of the superego as an 
omnipotent other. It is not hard to see that totemism, as the subjectivized 
delegation of enjoyment by the many to a phantasmatic exception, is 
very much akin to the structure of the social pact between proprietors - in 
Freud's case, the proprietors of women - who must abdicate their 
freedom and displace their sovereign powers onto an exception. 
Animism, on the other hand, has a striking resemblance to the structure 
of commodity fetishism, insofar as animism implies the extension to 
things of the relations of "I-thou" that people establish amongst 
themselves (Karatani, 2014) – its grammar approaches far more closely 
the sort of social pact between things at stake in the money-form.  
 
 What Pfaller's theory allows us to do is to show that the "discrete 
magic of the civilized" is perfectly effective in our enlightened society: 
even though psychoanalysis concerns itself almost exclusively with 
fantasies which are structured in accordance to the totemic form of 
displacement, whereby we know that someone else enjoys in our place, 
this cannot be generalized to mean that all phantasmatic formations in 
our culture are formed as the consequence of the "reality principle" 
making us painfully aware of our limitations to enjoy. Instead, Pfaller 
denounces the conviction of Freud and others that animistic cultures 
immediately believed in their illusions (Pfaller, 2014: 70), while magic, 
superstition and the animistic worldview are in fact perfectly compatible 
with the interpassive structure of belief.  
 This polemical claim has two crucial consequences. First of all, it 
separates the basic structure of animism from the theory of infantile 
sexuality, by distinguishing between the infantile belief in the power of 
our own thoughts to realise our desires from the indirect belief in a naive 
other who would then equate our ideas about things and these things 
themselves. As Pfaller puts it a propos of magic shows: 
  
magic is not horrible because it disappoints fantasies of 
omnipotence. It is not the fact that the presented omnipotence 
does not exist that is horrid, but rather the reverse: the awful thing 
is that the omnipotence does exist, yet not as the omnipotence of 
one's own thoughts, but instead as the omnipotence of a foreign, 




naive observer who fulfils every depicted wish. (...) The 
characteristic attitude of magic thus consists in knowing perfectly 
well that one cannot help reality through the use of signs, but 
nonetheless fearing that someone else who does not know that 
will make the meaning of signs come true. (...) Plenty of people 
who emphatically claim not to believe in voodoo would 
nonetheless still refuse to gouge out an eye in a picture of their 
own mother. All such everyday magicians are, in this sense, 
'sorcerer's apprentices', as depicted by Goethe: they conjure up 
more than they want" (2014: 260-261). 
 
 This essential distinction between the omnipotence of the ego and 
of the other – and therefore the infantile beliefs of children and of gods - 
becomes the cornerstone for a whole series of further differentiations in 
the psychoanalytic theory of obsessive neurotic rituals, perversion and 
superego which Pfaller develops throughout the book.  
 
 The second crucial consequence of the critique of "perspective-
based illusion" (2014: 70) which leads faith-based cultures to assume 
that all other cultures immediately subjectivize their beliefs is that it 
becomes possible to investigate the hypothesis that "the initially 
universal belief-form of organization of social illusions was later covered 
over by the faith-form in some societies" (ibid: 70). Not only does this 
hypothesis allow Pfaller to account for the emergence of the delegated 
belief that faith-based societies assign to belief-based ones, but it also 
leads him to an excavation of belief-based illusions within our own 
culture, an investigation which focuses especially on the role of the 
"naive observer" in the activity of play (ibid: 79-82) and politeness (ibid: 
117-118) to the corresponding theory of a cultural pleasure attainable 
only through the mediation of such naive observers  (ibid: 193). 
 
The ramifications of the research on interpassivity and delegated 
enjoyment are therefore far reaching. For our purpose, however, it 
suffices to realize that Žižek and Pfaller's subsequent extensions of 
Lacan's theory of the "subject supposed to" remain consistent with its 
fundamental properties. First, beliefs that are delegated are not defined 




by their content - as if some beliefs "must" be displaced while others can 
be directly assumed - but by the form of the illusion (Pfaller, 2014: 1), that 
is, the form in which the belief is organized is responsible for its effectivity 
as an illusion, not for its illusory status. The same property can be found 
in Lacan's theory of the subject supposed to know: the knowledge that 
emerges through this displacement is produced within the analytical 
setting, but it was not a secret knowledge, a "truer knowledge" of the 
analyst, to be distinguished from the immediate knowledge of the 
analysand. Furthermore, just like the theory of the subject supposed to 
know - which was based on the division of the analyst between material 
medium for the circuit of free association and virtual Other who is 
supposed to know the meaning of deviations in speech - the theory of 
interpassivity also features a set of substitutive practices which function 
as a material medium for the delegation and a virtual observer which is 
supposed to equate the substituted and the substitutive actions. With the 
essential distinction that while the analyst functions as a medium which 
the analysand enjoys - hence the actualization of unconscious love 
relations in the clinic - in the case of interpassivity the medium itself is 
responsible for enjoying in our place. Accordingly, while we deposit in the 
subject supposed to know an explanation as to why we enjoy the way 
we do, we assign to the subject supposed to belief some ignorance 
which justifies the equivalence between the delegated enjoyment and 
our actual pleasure.  
 
 The logic of delegated enjoyment is thus compatible with the 
Lacanian approach to the transferential dynamic, but, as Žižek had 
shown us already, the asymmetry between knowledge and belief 
requires us to pay attention to a "hidden variable" in the analytic theory, 
challenging the supposition that every delegation to the other is 
intransitive - so that I do not know what I suppose the other knows, like a 
process of property alienation – and that it will therefore serve as means 
to inscribe the subject's lack into speech – turning the unknowable 
dimension of my desire into something I don't know, but the other might. 
But how could we ever transform beliefs which have no place for us? 
 
 




4. Interventions in absentia 
 
I began this essay with an example taken from the fringes of 
contemporary psychoanalysis. The Testimony Clinic, like many other of 
the projects I briefly mentioned in the introduction, is in fact not 
considered strictly psychoanalytic, and the application and relevance of 
analytic ideas in the treatment of traumas associated with State violence 
remains a point of contention both between therapists of different 
theoretical orientations and amongst psychoanalysts themselves. What 
should be clear now, however, is that this is not so much a conflict 
between different ways to approach the object of intervention, but a 
problem internal to this object itself.  
 
 To introduce the specificity of dealing with the effects of  social 
catastrophes, I proposed the definition of social traumas as "personal 
effects with impersonal causes". This is a very tentative definition in that, 
for Lacanians, traumas always imply this underlying incommensurability 
between causes and effects. The intervention of the sexual is already a 
sort of indelible indetermination, more akin to a suspension in a causal 
chain than the imposition of a cause of greater intensity. Furthermore, 
symptoms are also defined as "effects without causes" – as ciphered 
messages about a past that did not take place, or better, which seeks to 
interpret the gap inscribed by the sexual – hence the classical Freudian 
theme of the "proton pseudos" and the retroactive construction of a 
traumatic narrative. In other words, the mismatch between causes and 
effects was always part of the psychoanalytic definition of trauma - so 
why would this define a distinct class of traumatic experiences? 
 
 Using our revision of Žižek and Pfaller's theories of delegated belief 
and interpassivity, we can now extend this definition. We have seen that 
the belief at stake in the money-form is formally "other" to the subject in 
the sense that it is a belief about the belief of the receiver of our money - 
about his trust that a third party will accept this paper as payment for 
another commodity. What is delegated to the other here is not only a 
belief that is not effective when assumed in the first person, it is also a 
belief about the consistency of the other's social relation to others. In 




other words, this belief does not participate in the consistency of myself 
as an individual, but in the consistency of commodity exchange itself - 
the very possibility of there being an infinite enchainment of use and 
exchange-values in a symbolic system. To suspend this belief is not to 
expose the inconsistency of the Other for a subject - that is, it is not a 
matter of revealing that the big Other does not exist as a guarantor for 
the meaning of our desires - it is rather to threaten the consistency of the 
Other for the other. We always knew magic is not real, but we believe the 
terrible performance of a magic trick could affect a child's sense of 
wonder, that is, the other's capacity to respond to the world - we always 
knew money is not real, but we believe an economic crisis might affect 
the level of trust in the value of our credit system amongst others. In both 
cases the trauma does not tear a hole in knowledge, leaving us without 
means to speak of what has happened to us, it rather rips the social 
fabric itself, the way it appears to itself, and not to us. The effects of such 
critical points can therefore be perfectly "ego-syntonic", in that they do 
not lead to an increase in our subjective experience of suffering. In fact, 
these situations tend to lead to an overcompensation at the level of our 
private fantasies, as they imply that we cannot count on the stability of 
our "real conditions of existence" to support our "imaginary relationship" 
to the world, usually leading us to invest even more in the capacity of our 
own immediate libidinal attachments to guarantee our individual 
identities.  
 
 In cases where psychic suffering is connected to economic crisis, 
such as the financial crisis of 2008, natural catastrophes, such as the 
Mariana disaster in Brazil, or a State war against the poor in the slums, 
we therefore face the additional challenge of listening not only to the 
speaker's singular relation to what has happened to them - the way 
these events challenged their identifications and interrupted reality by the 
more-than-real - but also to the implications these events carry for the 
delegated beliefs underlying the efficacy of social institutions. Could a 
project which relies on the "naive observer" that believes on the regular 
functioning of the State of law serve as the address of cases of State 
violence? We do not ask this question in the moral sense, but in the 
sense of its very clinical effectivity. 





 Consider, for example, the case of a mother who lost her son. A 
small-time drug dealer, he was executed without any due processing by 
the police after being caught in a police raid in a Brazilian favela, and his 
body disappeared, as the police needed to cover their tracks. The 
woman seeks help to deal with the pain of this loss – she struggles to 
speak out about what happened, as the stigma of her son's occupation 
seems, to many, to justify the police's behavior, and the abundance of 
similar cases further silences the scandalous nature of his murder. It is 
not speech alone which falters before the tragedy, but the other who 
lacks the resources to "absorb" the incommensurate cesura between 
cause and effects - after all, the very belief in state bureaucracy depends 
on the belief on a "naive other" who only rationally executes the law, 
without concern for social class and living condition of the state's 
citizens. In order to have some effectivity here, the Testimony Clinic must 
then carve for itself a place outside of the ideological common sense in 
order to restitute the very significance of what this woman can and 
cannot say. That is, it must organize itself without the help of this "naive 
observer" for whom different citizens are all equal before the law - by 
maintaining that the State is capable of such things, the project is in 
position to not to "make sense" what took place, but to mediate the 
senselessness of this traumatic event.. After individual and group 
sessions, which bring together families going through similar 
circumstances, the mourning mother is capable of separating the 
criminal activities of her son from the phantasmatic belief that his 
behavior should somehow justify his violent murder, a distinction which 
allows her to work through her libidinal ties to him and to undergo the 
mourning process.  
 
 What this brief vignette helps us to see is that the logistical 
conditions of the clinical space – the infrastructure of delegated beliefs it 
relies on in its very constitution as an "other space" – plays an important 
part in its capacity to serve as an address for psychic suffering that is 
traversed by traumas to the other. Perhaps this new field of problems 
could help us shed a light as to why it is that the efficiency of the private 
clinical setting - which remains the only setting capable of forming new 




psychoanalysts, and therefore a class filter to both analytical theory and 
practice - is somewhat compromised in contexts of great socio-
economic instability. What other form of legibility – other than as a 
"phallic signifier" or as part of the "dynamics of surplus-enjoyment" - 
could financial problems take in a clinical setting that itself depends on 
the belief (without which the analyst would not get paid) that the market 
will always take care of itself?  
 
 In Lacan's famous Seminar on the Purloined Letter (Lacan, 2006), 
he paints the image of the analyst as the "emissaries of all the purloined 
letters" - unaware of the meaning of these missives, we nonetheless 
accept them, keeping them "en souffrance with us in the transference", 
like the great detective Dupin, who is able to spot the significance of the 
purloined item without ever knowing what was written on it, simply by 
focusing on the circuit of exchanges it underwent in front of him. But 
Lacan does not stop there, and continues to ask if "it is not the 
responsibility their transference entails that we neutralize by equating it 
with the signifier that most thoroughly annihilates every signification --
namely, money?" (2006: 27). In other words, it is because we are paid 
that our desire as analysts is not at stake in transference, the 
responsibility of being addressees of these letters is neutralized insofar 
as the purity of the signifier-without-signified is guaranteed by the "purity" 
of the general equivalent – "the signifier that most thoroughly annihilates 
every signification". Usually this passage has been interpreted as a 
reduction of economic logic to the logic of the signifier: money is a 
special signifier, one which can "mean" any desire to consume, as it has 
no "particular" use-value – no one needs to ask "what do you want from 
this?" when there is a monetary exchange taking place. But another 
interpretation is possible now: the fact that the very efficacy of 
transference - insofar as the formal circuit that binds these significant 
normative deviations with a subject supposed to know their meaning - 
might depend on the delegated belief on the money-form. The fetishism 
of commodities grounding the fetishism of the signifier - a constitutive 
ignorance concerning the necessary social conditions for speech to 
acquire the form of a signifier in the clinical setting to begin with. 
 




1 The project is currently in its second edition and is composed of several centers of 
psychological care - two in São Paulo, one in Rio, one in Florianópolis and one in Porto 
Alegre - and has three different complementary orientations: to provide psychological 
assistance to those affected by State violence during the dictatorship, to promote 
training for public servants who work in the mental health department and to produce 
directions for the development of public policies. See: http://www.justica.gov.br/seus-
direitos/anistia/clinicas-do-testemunho-1 and http://www.justica.gov.br/central-de-
conteudo/anistia/anexos/livro-clinicas-do-testemunho.pdf 
2 It is important to note that both its clinical orientation - psychoanalysis or psychology? - 
and its assessment of the relation between the dictatorship and democratic sequences 
- continuation or distinction? - are current points of contention within the project. 
3 By "significant" I mean that which can be isolated in speech by interpretation. Tom 
Eyers calls this the "signifier-in-isolation" (Eyers, 2012 ) and Nancy and Lacoue-
Labarthe, in a forgotten but masterful early work, called "significance" of the signifier, in 
opposition to "signification" (Nancy & Lacoue-Labarthe, 1992) 
4 Giorgio Agamben, in his famous study Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the 
Archive (2002), has provided us with the paradigmatic treatment of this paradox: "In the 
relation between what is said and its taking place, it w as possible to bracket the 
subject of enunciation, since speech had already taken place. But the relation between 
language and its existence, between langue and the archive, demands subjectivity as 
that which, in its very possibility of speech, bears witness to an impossibility of speech. 
This is why subjectivity appears as witness; this is why it can speak for those who 
cannot speak. Testimony is a potentiality that becomes actual through an impotentiality 
of speech; it is, moreover, an impossibility that gives itself existence through a possibility 
of speaking. These two movements cannot be identified either with a subject or with a 
consciousness; yet they cannot be divided into two incommunicable substances. Their 
inseparable intimacy is testimony" (2002, 145) 
5 I use the expression "inform" in the sense of "giving form" - Lacan makes an interesting 
reference to this in his 16th Seminar: "What is indicated here as effect in the field of the 
imaginary is nothing other than the fact that this field of the Other is, as I might say, in 
the form of a. This in-forming is inscribed in a topology that, to image, (...) presents itself 
as holing it" (class of 7th of May 1969) 
6 Most of these comparisons have not yet received any formal or theoretical exposition, I 
rely here on reports from friends and colleagues, both practitioners and users of the 
project. 
7 Lacan, 1998 
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